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ABSTRACT 
The end of the Cold War was followed by a period of euphoric romanticism in 
Russia over its future relationship with Europe and the United States. Russians 
enthusiastically embraced the end of hostility and were looking forward to be accepted on 
equal terms in Europe. The situation changed when the country failed to utilize peace 
dividends and the economy suffered a serious breakdown. 
The Russian political elite expressed concerns that this policy was the Euro- 
Atlantic community's attempt to underscore the dimension of Russian humiliation and to 
further limit Russian influence in the international arena. Russia adamantly opposed 
NATO advancement to the territory of the former USSR; by exploiting this hard stance 
Moscow, indeed, provided NATO aspirants with arguments to join the Alliance. 
There is a tendency in Russia to view its relationship with NATO through the 
prism of the U.S. dominant role in the Alliance. This perception explains why Moscow 
tries to assert its position by focusing on a big power dialogue. Russian leaders attitudes 
toward NATO enlargement are strongly tied to their estimates of the strength of the 
country and their influence in the international arena. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The end of the Cold War was followed by a period of euphoric romanticism in 
Russia over its future relationship with the West. Russians enthusiastically embraced the 
end of hostility and looked forward to be equal members of the European family of 
nations. The situation changed when the country failed to seize peace dividends and the 
economy suffered a serious breakdown. This coincided in time with NATO enlargement. 
The Russian political elite suspected that this policy was the Euro-Atlantic community's 
attempted to underscore the dimension of Russian humiliation and to further limit 
Russian influence in the international arena. Russia adamantly opposed NATO 
advancement to the territory of the former USSR; by exploiting this hard stance Moscow, 
indeed, provided NATO aspirants with arguments to join the Alliance on the ground of 
securing their sovereignty and proving their belonging to the Western community. 
There has been a tendency in Russia to view the relationship with NATO through 
the prism of the U.S. dominant role in the Alliance; this perception explains why Moscow 
tries to assert its position through focusing on a big powers dialogue. This attitude is 
counterproductive because it raises concerns in other countries that are very sensitive to 
their status as independent international entities. 
Russia's anti-NATO rhetoric in the 1990s, which was anti-American in its core, 
originated in the frustration provided by a the troublesome social and economic 
transition. It was exacerbated by the fact that in the past decade Russia had to fight hard 
for new self-identification. The thesis also argues that rhetoric was were mainly inwardly 
oriented, and was deeply rooted in internal problems of the country. 
xi 
Russian attitudes toward NATO enlargement is strongly bound the self-estimated 
strength of the country, and the issue will be gradually losing its saliency as Russia's 
internal economic and social situation improves. 
At the same time, Russia's national image remains a complex subject that will be 
debated within Russian for years to come. It will influence Russia's its view of foreign 
policy priorities. What can be predicted is that even if Russian political elite and people 
in general come to grips with identifying Russia's proper relationship to the West, 
security debates will continue on a realist-geopolitical basis. 
xu 
INTRODUCTION 
A.       PURPOSE OF THESIS 
This thesis examines the evolution of Russian attitudes to the Western powers 
in the period from 1991 until the present 
The central argument of this thesis is that the evolving anti-NATO rhetoric, 
which was anti-American in its core, in Russia in the 1990s, had a predictable and 
natural character. It had its origins in the realm of political perceptions, and was 
exacerbated by the fact that in the past decade Russia had to fight hard for its new 
identity. The thesis also argues that these antagonistic reflections were mainly for 
internal political purposes. 
The notion of the West has a peculiar meaning when discussing Russia's 
position toward European and Euro-Atlantic communities and alliances. 
This thesis speculates on what could have been avoided in the discussions 
about security issues between Russia and the West since 1991. 
The broad character of the subject at hand, precludes a narrow-focused case 
study, although the thesis incorporates a chapter describing from the author's point of 
view, a successful experience in initiating, developing, and maintaining military-to- 
military contacts between Russia and the United States. This example represents the 
experience that has already been built into a foundation of defense and security 
cooperation between the West and Russia. 
The thesis also touches upon the contingency of weakening the trans-Atlantic 
security bond through the process of a growing European defense identity, and its 
implications for Russia. 
The thesis reflects the personal views of the author only, and should not be 
considered as reflecting the views of any government agency whatsoever. 
B.       GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE FIELD OF STUDY 
In the past decade, the debate in Russia in both political and economic circles 
on the problem of European security was focused on the issue of NATO enlargement. 
It is not an accidental development for it to have begun from a natural desire, whether 
conscious or unconscious, to attribute real problems in the sphere of security to the 
most conspicuous relevant issue, or NATO enlargement.1 
However, there are some fundamental foreign policy issues which most of the 
political forces in Russia agree to recognize as valid. An extremely negative attitude 
towards NATO's enlargement can be identified as one of them because it became an 
issue that united a broad spectrum of the Russian political elite. Why do liberals and 
die-hard communists, doves and hawks not have many differences on this subject? It 
is logical to assume that there is a consensus within the Russian elite on some 
1
 Tatiana Parkhalina, "Of Myth and Illusions: Russian Perceptions of NATO Enlargement." Available [On line] at 
http://w\vw.nato.int'docu/revievv/article&/9703-3.htm. March 2001. 
2 
fundamental issues concerning the weakened position of the country worldwide and 
that this agreement is not at odds with the general reactive perception of the common 
people. 
Attempting to conceptualize the domestic sources of Russian foreign policy 
have led many authors in Russia and the West to emphasize the differences between 
various schools of thought within the Russian political elite. Classifying the Russian 
foreign policy community members into Atlantists and Eurasianists, and paralleling 
these notions with democrats and communists, has become one of the main topics in 
the literature on Russian policy-making. Indeed, different political actors in Russia 
use divergent or distorting analytical lenses through which they view the same world 
in many different ways. The invoked conceptualization of the state is that the nation 
and security depends on episodic or pursued needs. While the government develops 
concrete programs and concepts, the opposition uses publications, program materials 
and rhetoric simply to promote its own interests disguised as positions.^ 
This inevitably leads to different expressions of what Russia is. Russia's major 
security challenges, political goals and instruments of security policies are described 
differently as well. 
Analyzing Russia's reactions to geopolitical changes in the world requires 
answering some basic questions. How do the leading political forces in Russia map 
9 
*• Igor Zevelev, "NATO's Enlargement and Russian Perception of Eurasian Political Frontiers," available from 
the author at zevelev(S>marshallcenter.org. 
Eurasia after the breakup of the Soviet Union? How do cognitive maps of Eurasia 
appear on the foreign policy agenda? Will Russian hypothetical attitudes towards 
NATO's acceptance of former Soviet republics, or NATO moving directly to Russian 
borders, be dramatically different from reacting to Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic joining the Alliance in particular? 
The premise of this thesis is that Russia has a legitimate right to identify itself 
as a European state. Political elites both in the West and East often emphasize 
speculative identifications aimed at achieving circumstantial or parochial benefits. It 
never hurts to have an image of the enemy at hand that can be used to divert public 
opinion from the real problems, or as a bargaining chip. 
Therefore, the existence of a gray zone in defining Russia's position toward 
Europe is maintained both in Russia and the West mainly for political reasons. There 
is nothing abnormal about this phenomenon, but since it takes place mainly in the 
realm of perceptions, a potential danger for making incorrect decisions based upon 
incorrect image projections is significant, especially where public policy-making is 
concerned. 3 
Geographic continuation of Europe into Russia has always garnered special 
importance in the discussion of the political frontiers of the latter, or in other words, 
how to properly define the limits of the two entities. This had not been an issue until 
Tatiana Parkhalina, "Of Myth and Illusions: Russian Perceptions of NATO Enlargement." Available [On line] at 
htrp://www.nato.int/docu/revievv/artirie^9703-3.htm. March 2001. 
the time of Peter the Great, when in the beginning of the 18th century, he aggressively 
pushed the country to increase its participation in European affairs. However, even 
after that, Russia was usually considered an outsider and a foreign power, and very 
culturally and politically different from Europe. 
Nevertheless, Russia played a significant role as a balancing power. Some 
examples of this balancing act occurred in the beginning of the 18th century against 
Sweden; in the beginning of the 19th century against Napoleon's France; and in the 
middle of the 20th century against Nazi Germany. At least twice, and for long periods 
of time, Russia also played the role of the European "policeman" and the power 
adhering to the achieved status quo in Europe after the war with Napoleon, and also 
after 1945.4 
The victory over Nazi Germany, which was paid for heavily by unprecedented 
sacrifices, brought Russia, the stereotypical name for the Soviet Union at the time, to 
its apex in terms of influence in international relations. Russia, or the Soviet Union, 
received its most significant and influential role, or that of sharing, with the United 
States, the new bipolar world split into spheres of influence and control. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union created an unprecedented security paradigm 
by leaving Russia with a huge territory, a large amount nuclear weapons, and vast 
natural resources. However, it was economically crippled. On the one hand, this 
4
 Igor Zevelev, "NATO's Enlargement and Russian Perception of Eurasian Political Frontiers," available from 
the author at zevel ev@ marsh allcenter.org. 
caused fears of chaos and unpredictability in international relations, especially in the 
former Soviet Bloc, and raised serious concerns about the eastern borders of the 
European Union. Thus, the new situation enabled the advancement of what later 
would be called the unipolar world with the United States at the lead. 
However, one of the most troublesome outcomes of the new situation was that 
the Russian public and political elite, barely and reluctantly accepted, the relegation to 
a significantly lower international status after being a major world power. The 
painful, but uncertain public reaction to the loss of superpower status and prestige, 
combined with the increase in internal problems, will be exploited and persistently 
shaped by the political establishment into national exceptionalism under different 
names. The fact that these anti-western factors, such as the United States and NATO, 
do not have a substantive, but a perceptional character, is revealed in a search for 
labels such as "westernizers," or "patriots," for their supporters.5 
This paper is an attempt to look at the particular factors affecting Russian 
perceptions and to speculate on how the latter translate into politics. 
5
 Ibid. 
II.       A NEW PARADIGM: POSITION OF RUSSIA AFTER THE END OF 
THE COLD WAR 
A.       GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION AFTER THE END 
OF THE COLD WAR 
1.        Failed Expectations (Euphoria) of the Early 1990s 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was greeted with euphoria 
on both sides of the Iron Curtain but this soon gave way to concerns over more 
pragmatic issues such as the transition to democracy in the old Soviet Union, the 
creation of peaceful relationships between its former constituent members, and their 
survival. Another crucial question was how they would relate to their former 
ideological enemy, the West, and, in particular, to NATO.6 
The end of the Cold War created early hopes that Western-Russian relations 
would be warm and broad based. These hopes have been dashed by exaggerated 
expectations, a lack of political will, and recurring statements reminiscent of the Cold 
War7 
However, what has been termed the "honeymoon period" (1992-1993) in U.S.- 
Russian relations, with the United States symbolizing the West and when agreements 
6
 Derek Hunns, "Russia and NATO", available [On line] at 
http://\v\v\v.intellectbooks.corn/europa'nurnber4/hunn.htrn. April 2001. 
Laura   Payne,   "U.S.-Russian   Security   Relations",   available   [On   line]   at   http://www.foreignpolicy- 
infocus.org/briefs/vol3/v3n26fsu_body.html 
such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START-3 in January 1993 came 
quickly, and when the anticipation of good future relationships was high, soon turned 
into disenchantment. While many United States policymakers considered Russia to be 
a continuation of a defeated adversary, in other words, the Soviet Union, Russian 
politicians have come to believe that the United States seeks even further hegemony 
and they will do everything to endure Russian weakness.8 
Russia became suspicious of the actions of the United States in Eastern 
Europe. The situation started changing very quickly when initial considerations about 
a possibility of NATO enlargement into the territory of former Warsaw Treaty 
countries were made public. 9 
One of the frequent passages in political commentaries of those days is an 
anecdotal reference to a story that when, at the talks over the reunification of 
Germany, Western leaders promised M. Gorbachev that NATO would never 
incorporate any of the former Soviet Bloc countries.10 
The drive to start the process of NATO enlargement was formally launched by 
President Clinton at the Summit meeting in Brussels in January 1994. The Alliance 
leaders also stated that they expected and would welcome NATO enlargement which 









transcriPts were ever presented in the latest publication on this subject in "Nezavisimaya gazeta" 05 June 
2001, it was referred to as "according to claims by the former President of the USSR M.Gorbachev ... Western leaders 
assured him...." 
8 
into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe, although 
NATO did not invite any particular country into NATO until the Madrid Summit in 
July 1997.11 
That decision led the Russian political elite to adopt easily a position of 
suspicion and mistrust, even though at that particular time, there were still no 
examples that the Russians could use to justify their concerns. 12 
2.        NATO's Policy in the 1990s 
Soon after their resignations, Warren Christopher, Secretary of State in 1993- 
1997, and William Perry, Secretary of Defense in 1994-1997, argued for a new 
NATO mission in October 1997: 
It is time to move beyond the enlargement debate. Adding the new 
members is not the only, or even the most important, debate over the 
alliance's future. A much larger issue looms: What is the alliance's 
purpose?1 Their answer was that the alliance should be defending 
common interests, not territory. 'Shifting the alliance's emphasis from 
defense of members' territory to defense of common interests is the 
strategic imperative. 13 
11
 "NATO Enlargement", available [On line] at http:/Avw^'.nato.int/docu/comm/m97070S/infopre&/e-enl.htm. 
April 2001. 
12
 Celeste   A.Wallander,   "Russian-U.S.   Relations   in   the   Post-Cold   World,"   available   [On   line]   at 
http://\v\v\v.harvard.edu/~ponars/TOLICY%10MEMOS/Wallander70.html. March 2001. 
13
 Article by Warren Christopher and William Perry, "NATO's True Mission," New York Times, October 21, 
9 
Among the major threats to common interests are the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, disruption of oil supplies, terrorism, genocidal violence and wars 
of aggression in different regions. It is interesting that a threat coming from an anti- 
Western nuclear power deeply suspicious about NATO intentions on the borders of 
the Alliance was not mentioned at all.14 The territory of Alliance members was not 
viewed to be seriously threatened in any foreseeable future. The main feature that was 
characteristic of the discussion of NATO goals was the talk about defending common 
interests, rather than territory. This had two big ramifications. First, there emerged a 
considerable number of states expressing the desire to share those interests, based 
upon claims of common values. Values became notionally and misleadingly, equal to 
interests. Second, the same process delineates vast areas to the East, which, based on 
historical prejudices, are never expected to reach an adequate understanding of 
accepted norms of political behavior, which thus implies no prospect for sharing 
values and interests. 
The first factor became a driving force for NATO territorial expansion, which 
provided for some inconsistency between the stated non-existence of a need to be 
concerned about adding defended territories as there was no threat, and a desire to 
enlarge the shared interests club. 
1997, available from the archives [On line] at www.time.com. 
Igor Zevelev, "NATO's Enlargement and Russian Perception of Eurasian Political Frontiers," available from 
the author at zevelev(£:marshallcenter.org. 
10 
So far, NATO has been trying to alleviate this contradiction, which is eagerly 
perceived in Russia. The year 1999 was a symbolic year in this sense. The Kosovo 
operation and the formal admission of the three new members was an indication. 
3.        Some Reasons for Russian Reaction to NATO Enlargement 
For Russia, territorial enlargement has been the central issue and forms the 
background for all other problems related to NATO. One of the reasons for this lies in 
a significantly undermined influence of Russia in international politics. On the 
surface, the fact that Russia is even now a big country was the only argument that it 
could use to claim that it was still a great power. This was logically followed by 
invoking geopolitical, realists' theories, and by further asserting the unquestionable 
character of national sovereignty, and implying that humanitarian concerns are mostly 
disguised attempts to infringe on the latter. Russia's reaction to the Kosovo operation 
in 1999 can be explained in the context of NATO enlargement and decreased 
influence of Russia on the diplomatic scene. 
For the purpose of analysis, it is important to discern between two connected, 
but still very different issues. The first, called Expansion One, is the NATO 
enlargement which has already occurred, and the second is the possible second round 
of NATO enlargement called Expansion Two. The first has become a reality while the 
second is more than probable in the future. 
11 
The Alliance's Strategic Concept approved by the heads of state and 
government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington 
D. C. on April 23 and 24,1999 said it explicitly: 
NATO expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations 
willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of 
membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these 
nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the 
Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall 
European security and stability... No European democratic country 
whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Treaty will be 
excluded from consideration. 15 
From the Russian perspective, the critical point is not the second round per se, 
but whether it will include any of the former Soviet republics, namely the Baltic states 
or the Ukraine. Expansion Two may be perceived by Russia as relatively acceptable if 
it is limited to the inclusion of countries that have almost never been perceived as true 
allies, or as significant actors in terms of zones of influence. In this case, it could be a 
relatively easy second wave of expansion to which Moscow would not react 
excessively. 
The official NATO documents and statements avoid making a distinction 
between potential candidates solely on the basis of having formerly belonged to the 
Soviet Union. 
* u 1xTThtAll!anCe'S Strate«ic Concept. Approved by the heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D. C. on 23 and 24 April 1999 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information 
and Press, 1999), pp. 11-12. 
12 
American foreign policymakers keep saying that historic and geographic 
factors, such as formerly being a part of the Soviet Union, cannot exclude certain 
countries from NATO. Former deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said: 
The process of enlargement is ongoing. No one is going to be excluded 
on the basis of geography and history. And there is no reason why the 
second round should be any more difficult or controversial than the 
first. In fact, it should be easier. 16 
That statement was supported by what has always exacerbated Russia's 
reaction as former Defense Secretary W. Cohen similarly said: 
the door remains open. It's not geographically confined. Whichever 
countries wish to become part of NATO, if they satisfy the 
requirements, they'll be considered for membership. There will be no 
determination made by anyone outside the alliance. *? 
Assumptions about the irrelevance of geography in official statements and 
documents are diplomatic code words which mean that Russia is attempting to define 
certain areas in Europe as zones where the Russian opinion will more important than 
the views of other countries. According to W. Cohen, these attempts will be ignored. 
Paradoxically, in practical discussions on the admittance of the former Soviet 
republics into NATO, a geographic factor, namely the proximity of Russia, does play 
a role. A closer look reveals that the realists' approach is not an exclusive trademark 
of Russia. Some Western representatives, especially American conservative 
representatives, like to portray Russia as an authoritarian and expansionist bear and its 
16
 New York Times, May 4, 1998, as cited in the article by Sergey Rogov Security Relations between Russia and 
the Western World, available [On line] at http://www.fsk.ethz.cli/publ/studies/volume_l/Rogov.htm. 
Robert Burns, "Russian Opposes More NATO Expansion," available on search from the Pro Quest Database, 
requested 12 Oct 2000. 
13 
neighbors as potential victims that must be protected by the West. This more than 
perfectly matches the reactive Russian logic by deepening the suspicion of the 
Russian political elites towards any liberal talk about shared values and openness of 
the Alliance to new democratic members. For example, a New-York Time columnist 
W.Safire advocated taking into NATO Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the 
Baltic states, the most Westernized nations of Eastern Europe, and ultimately the 
Ukraine as it privatizes: 
The time to push the protective line eastward is now, while Russia is 
weak and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later, when such a 
move would be an insufferable provocation to a superpower.!8 
This is a very recognizable theme and a nice present to the Russian political 
establishment. Russians are well equipped to discuss the issue of NATO's expansion 
m realists' terms and eagerly present their own counter arguments. Russian 
interpretation of geographic and historic factors differs dramatically from those held 
in the West. However, acknowledgement of the importance of these real arguments 
proves to the Russians that their concerns are valid. 
There are very serious reasons to believe that the second round, if it includes 
any former Soviet republics, will be much more controversial than the first round. 
Russian opposition to Expansion One can be explained by the fear that it was 
only the beginning. The real threat, according to many Russians, is further expansion 
into the territory of the former Soviet Union. To them, it would not only signify a 
As cited in the article by Sergey Rogov, Security Relations between Russia and the Western World available 
[On line] at http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/publ/studies/volume_l/Rogov.htm. 
14 
dramatic shift in the terms of the balance of power, but would also cut perceptional 
links with the great past, with the once again perceived geopolitical gains of the 
enormous sacrifices made by earlier generations. World War II started for Russia with 
the invasion of its Western borders by the power with which Russia had a non- 
aggression pact. As a result, Russia lost about 28 million people in that war. This 
explains why it is so deeply rooted in Russian history to not take into account 
proclaimed intensions, but to assess a probable military threat from the balance of 
power approach. 
Russians are deeply apprehensive about the strengthening of any foreign 
military capabilities on its Western borders. Adding new members to NATO is 
viewed as a way of doing so, which is why the Russian parliament, sensitive to the 
public disposition, reacted by calling NATO enlargement the most serious security 
threat to Russia after the end of World War II. 
The second round of NATO expansion, if or when it happens, will probably 
have far greater domestic consequences than Expansion One. The Russian perception 
of the importance of the Central European states and the Balkans differ from that of 
other territories which once used to be a part of one big country. This particularly 
applies to the Ukraine. 
There has also been another significant phenomenon in the post-Cold War 
Russia. Many Russians still perceive the collapse of the Soviet Union as a negative 
event, which, as some believe, still might not be the end of the Soviet Union. 
15 
The presidential candidate in the 1995 elections, retired general Alexander 
Lebed, stated the widespread Russian attitude of the deceased Soviet Union as 
follows: "and the Soviet Union was no more, those who do not regret its collapse lack 
a heart, but those who think that it will be possible to recreate it in its old form, lack a 
brain."19 
The importance of the attitudes described above lies primarily in the fact that 
the Soviet Union, or what could be called the Soviet Empire, including the Baltic 
states, not Russia proper, was the alleged homeland for most Russians. 
In the long run, the changing character of NATO and the good relationship 
between the Euro-Atlantic Community and Russia are much more important to the 
latter than adding or not adding some new members to the Alliance. However, the 
point at when trust prevails, has not yet been attained. Kosovo changed the situation 
for the worse, which is why the further enlargement of NATO may seriously 
aggravate tensions along the lines of separating the notional de facto Europe from the 
rest of its legitimate areas. 
The Russian position is better explained not by the generic negative view of 
country leaders on NATO enlargement, but by the fact that the expansion of the 
Alliance touches very sensitive issues in the Russian identity. 
Aleksandr Lebed, Za derzhavu obidno, Russian newspaper Moskovskaya Pravda, archives: May 1995. 
16 
4.        Important   Considerations   for   Russian   Reaction   to   NATO 
Enlargement 
Apparently, whatever factors determine Russia's reaction to NATO 
enlargement, its efficiency is very low. Ironically, Russia, adhering to loud rhetoric 
and demonstrating its irreconcilable position towards the further enlargement of 
NATO, has actually, to a certain extent, intensified the process. 
Today, at least three main angles of viewing the role of NATO and the 
associated possible gains can be identified. 
The first is the American goal to maintain its strategic leadership through the 
leverage it has as the most powerful member of the Alliance. This allows the United 
States to remain involved in European affairs where it has a legitimate voice. 
This is often presented in Russia as the most important argument against 
relying on NATO as the central collective security institution in the Euro-Atlantic 
zone. However, the question is if the United States is present in Europe against the 
will of the other countries. The answer is no. NATO has proven to be a stable and 
useful security scheme for Europeans first and foremost. 
This constitutes the second angle of the European view of NATO. Russia's 
attempts at using phraseology about pure European concerns cannot achieve any 
positive goal in the least, and, at most, it can lead to a reputation as a spoiler. 
17 
The third angle seems to be the most important in the context of a perceptional 
bias in this thesis. It appears that Russia failed to recognize that the process of NATO 
enlargement is no longer in the control of the big players, which includes the United 
States. 
Discussions on NATO enlargement today are initiated not from inside the 
Alliance. Many publications generated from inside NATO actually demonstrate a 
certain degree of prudence.20 
NATO enlargement is pushed from the outside, and the set of claims by the 
aspirant countries cannot be easily thwarted, even if there were such a strong desire 
among NATO members. The reason for this is simple. The drive for membership is 
not imposed by somebody else's will, but is rooted in a democratic process and 
pushed forward by democratic institutions of sovereign states. 
In this regard, defense and security issues of NATO enlargement entered the 
realm of domestic political agendas and civil-military relations in aspiring 
countries.21 
The latter factor, probably, is among other reasons why the discourse on 
NATO enlargement has taken on a new very noteworthy aspect. New members 
should be invited to join NATO as soon as possible exactly because Russia objects to 
Some examples are: "NATO Enlargement, Issues and Answers" by S. Grieg, J. Arnold, INSS, available [On 
lmel at http://www.airpowr.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aDisum98/amold.html. March 2001; "Russia and NATO" by 
Derek Hunns; "Russian-U.S. Relations in the Post-Cold War World" by Celeste Wallander. 
"J 1 
Glen Segal, "NATO Enlargement: International Relations or Civil-Military Relations," available [On line] at 
https://ww'wc.cc.columbia.edu./sec/dlc/ciao/conf/segQ2/seg02.html. April 2001. 
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it, and Moscow should not be able to hope to veto or interfere in another country's 
affairs without an invitation.22 
5.        What Are Common Options for Russia and The Euro-Atlantic 
Community? 
Is it possible for Russia to achieve greater influence in European affairs and at 
the same time foster its security? The most understandable for Russia, in the guise of 
a realistic approach, might be to not alienate the country from the much more 
powerful Alliance, but integrate it into European security structures or at least into 
some of them. 
Hierarchies of national interests are different in Russia than in the United 
States and Europe. Any issues related to the territory of the former Soviet Union rank 
very high in Russian priorities because they are linked to the fundamentals of Russian 
self-perception. It is impossible for Russia to be indifferent to the policies of its 
neighbors. To assure that Russia's policies in the region stem from understandable 
security concerns, the United States, Europe, and NATO would be wise to actively 
pursue engaging Russia in a collaboration on a wide variety of issues. Russia seeks 
recognition as a great country, which deserves a much more sophisticated policy than 
simply the suggestion that it is another instant state created on the ruins of the Soviet 
empire. 
22
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The following suggestion goes beyond the European dimension, but here it is 
and is especially valid: "...the United States needs to recognize that Russia is a great 
power, and that we will always have interests that conflict as well as coincide."23 
When the Russian political elite gains confidence that Russia's status is not 
subject to question, it will very soon cast off some sort of inferiority complex which 
leads to unpredictable impulses and over-reacting. The following statement by C. 
Rice is also relevant not only for the American context: "...it must be recognized that 
American security is threatened less by Russia's strength than by its weakness and 
incoherence. "24 
Due to its geographic position, human and natural resources, Russia has a 
legitimate right to strive for an equal level of influence in European security affairs. 
The most efficient and acceptable way of doing so is integration. 
However, is it feasible to think, even in terms of some remote future, that 
Russia would acquire equal say in European defense structures, including closer 
participation in NATO affairs? Will Russia's membership in NATO, or maybe with 
some special status, ever become something more than a farfetched mental exercise? 
What are the possible alternatives if the answers are negative or hesitant? 





The following is a characteristic example of Western assumptions that 
correspond well with the previously discussed Russian inclination to explain 
international politics in the terms of balance of power, which is exactly the approach 
that Moscow is often criticized or even ridiculed for, and which is exploited to justify 
the continuation of neo-containment policies. 
Much of American and European geopolitical and strategic thinking about 
Eurasia has been based on the fear of Russian imperialism and attempts to prevent its 
revival. Zbigniew Brzezinski, whose views, of course, do not represent the entirety of 
American perceptions but remain influential in Washington's academic community, 
has contributed to this approach significantly. He warned American policymakers 
about Russia's designs to revitalize a regionally hegemonic Russia...to become again 
the strongest power in Eurasia. Unlike the old centralized Soviet Union and its 
neighboring bloc of satellite states, the new arrangements would embrace Russia and 
its satellite states within the former Soviet Union in some kind of confederation.25 
Instead, Brzezinski suggested another, much smaller, confederation, when he 
wrote about the desirability of "a loosely confederated Russia - composed of a 
European Russia, a Siberian Republic, and a Far Eastern Republic."26 In other words, 
Russia, even with its present borders, is too big for Brzezinski. He sees Russia in its 
J
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present form as a force that can obstruct the American geopolitical goals of 
dominating Eurasia. 
This point of view does have its audience both in the United States as well as 
in Europe, and is capable of preventing Russian admission into Euro-Atlantic security 
structures. 
Another possible delay in this process could come from a completely different 
way of thinking which maintains the overall perceptional bias of this thesis. 
What has not yet been mentioned is the important fact that national Russia, in 
the view of many common people and the elite of this country, includes all the 
Russian diasporas in the near abroad, and thus spreads well beyond the borders of the 
Russian Federation.27 Abstract notions of a nation-state are mechanically applied to 
the region, which has not had any stable historic experience and where "national" 
primarily means ethnic. Building "national" Russia may also alienate non-ethnic 
Russians within the Russian Federation. This fact makes calls for a national Russia 
extremely dangerous for both regional and global security. 
Paradoxically, thinking of Russia as a potentially European state may slow its 
integration into international institutions and security arrangements. The size of the 
country, its diversity, nuclear arsenal, instability on its Southern borders, economic 
problems, the existence of multimillion-member diasporas, and the peculiarities of 
27 This subject was widely discussed in the Russian media during the last Presidential campaign. 
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national identity make Western countries very cautious when discussing admitting 
Russia into European or transatlantic institutions as a member.28 
Acknowledging legitimacy of the latter considerations, a possible suggestion 
for the West may be to recognize Russia as a continuation of itself, seamlessly 
extending into a significant and important other. 
For Russia, joining NATO in any imaginable form has perceptional difficulties 
also. The major difficulty, as was repeatedly mentioned previously, derives from the 
balance of power approach. Based on the assumption that a political-military alliance 
has to be geared against some threat, Russia cannot help but to be suspicious of the 
true meaning of the Alliance's new Strategic Concept. In addition, Russian political 
thinking tends to emphasize NATO's military dimension, implying a greater 
significance in the hierarchical structures and differences in the real clout each 
member wields. 
6.        Suggested Solutions 
It could be recommended that the relationship between the Euro-Atlantic 
security community and Russia should be strengthened not through n+1 formulae, but 
rather by the means of individual relations with Russia, becoming a network of 
intertwined connections with the West, and remaining bilateral for Russia at every 
instance. 
28
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On the one hand, this system is better suited for developing confidence 
because it provides diverse channels of communication. It affords greater flexibility 
towards alleviating inevitable disagreements as well. 
On the other hand, integrated Western communities-Russia relationships 
should be institutionalized and maintained in parallel with bilateral networking. This 
combination is particularly well suited for constituting legitimacy, firstly, because it 
provides a forum, and secondly, its diverse system prevents allegations of usurpation 
of important decision-making by bigger players. 
B.       IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE DIPLOMACY 
Defense diplomacy here actually implies two major elements. One is an 
established system of attache office representatives, and the second is military-to- 
military contacts in the form of a broad variety of exchanges between militaries from 
different countries. 
In the light of democratic civil-military relations, because decisions are made 
in the political realm, defense diplomacy by itself does not guarantee the prevention 
of problematic security issues. 
1. Positive Experience of the U.S.-Russian Military-To-Military 
Contacts in the Framework of Defense Diplomacy 
The major reason for conducting defense diplomacy as the first element 
implies, by all means, should be seen as maintaining undistorted channels of contacts. 
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As for the second element, trust must be developed between counterparts who have 
first line access to weapons, and engendering it to higher political echelons. 
Despite uncertainties in U.S.-Russian diplomatic relationships, military-to- 
military contact programs between the two states continued to evolve and were 
supported by senior military officers on both sides until the Spring 1999 bombing of 
Serbia put them on hold. 
Over the past decade, the military organizations of the United States and 
Russia have established and institutionalized a set of programs and cooperation with 
each other. These activities received continued renewal agreements and resulted in 
regular contacts which were strengthened overall, and were even steadily 
strengthening in scope even as U.S.-Russian diplomatic relations with each other 
were strengthening. That development was evolving smoothly until the NATO 
bombing of Serbia put them on hold. 
Military-to-military programs continued, even in an era when the security 
relationship between the United States and Russia was sometimes shaky. Russian 
spokesmen have universally condemned NATO expansion as a threat to core Russian 
interests, while U.S. policy makers repeatedly criticized Russia for its failure to 
prevent the export of sensitive technology to countries of interest to America. There 
had been repeated disagreements on how to react to Serbian activities in Kosovo 
before NATO action began. Some observers saw these diplomatic conflicts over 
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security policy as heralding a resurgence of hostility between the two states.29 Yet, as 
described below, U.S.-Russian military contact and cooperation programs were only 
tangentially affected for years by the difficulties of the post-Cold War cooperative 
order. In fact, the very existence of these programs demonstrated the lack of hostility 
between the two sides' military organizations, despite the sometimes acrimonious 
diplomatic exchanges that have occurred in recent years. 
Programs continued even though some officials of the Pentagon and the 
Russian General Staff viewed these programs as a waste of time, and diverting their 
organizations from their primary missions of preparation for potential future 
warfare.30 
These programs were intended to serve military officers by providing both 
sides opportunities for training and learning new skills, providing the Russian side a 
"voice", or a degree of influence in international security matters, at a time of decline 
in state power; and providing both sides with "transparency". 
2.        Recent Russian Military Cooperation with the United States 
The history of U.S.-Russian military ties has been explored elsewhere,31 and 
need not be recounted here. The programs that put officers from both sides in contact 
Pavel Felgengauer, "U.S. Congress Approves Sanctions against Russia: The Cold War Is Still on for the U S 
Law-Makers,": Segonya, May 25,1998, as translated by RIA-Novosti news service. 
30
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9 (Spring 1985): 154-184; Michael J. McCarthy, "Comrades in Arms: Russian-American Military-to-Military Contacts 
Since 1992," Journal of Slavic Military Studies 9 (December 1996): 743-78, especially 774-50. 
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with each other cover a wide range of activities, ranging from on-site inspections 
mandated by several arms control and reduction treaties to the consultations, 
workshops, and joint exercises occurring on a multilateral level between Russia and 
NATO as a result of the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and 
Security. All of these programs were intended to enhance stability in the post-Cold 
War security order. 
Three types of bilateral military-to-military efforts have been especially 
significant in fostering good working relations between U.S. and Russian officers, and 
are mentioned below: 
• the 1989 Dangerous Military Activities (DMA) Agreement, designed to 
prevent the unintentional or miscalculated use of force in peacetime 
• officer conferences, unit visits, and joint exercises that are designed as 
confidence and security-building measures, to break down enemy images 
and foster trust and communication between military services in the two 
countries 
• joint peacekeeping activities, most notably Russian participation alongside 
U.S. forces in the NATO-led Implementation Force (EFOR) and 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia under United Nations auspices, which 
continued even after NATO air strikes in Kosovo began. 
It was the DMA agreement, and particularly the negotiations leading up to it, 
that fundamentally set the stage for the institutionalization of U.S.-Russian military- 
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to-military contacts that followed. This was the first set of negotiations in the history 
of U.S.-Soviet relations to be primarily headed, designed, and signed by military 
officers on both sides, and it flowed from the unprecedented one-on-one meetings 
held by Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, William Crowe with his Soviet 
counterpart, Chief of the General Staff Sergei Akhromeev, during the latter's 1998 
U.S. visit. 
The DMA agreement was designed "to reduce the possibility of incidents 
between [our] armed forces, to facilitate rapid peaceful resolution of those incidents 
which result from dangerous military activities, and to assure the safety of personnel 
of ships, aircraft, and land-based installations."32 
To accomplish these tasks, the DMA agreement set out a series of 
proscriptions and prescriptions designed to regulate everyday military behavior in 
contexts where the two sides might encounter each other on a daily basis. Examples 
included limits on the use of aircraft lasers when in proximity to forces of the other 
side, prohibition against the use of command and control jamming against the other 
side, and the prescribed use of particular radio frequencies and other communications 
procedures in the event of dangerous unforeseen incidents or accidental incursions 
into the other side's national territory.33 Most importantly for the military-to-military 
contacts that would follow, the DMA agreement created a permanent Joint Military 





Commission for the express purpose of having senior officers meet annually to 
discuss matters of concern to either country. 
The substantive coordination and policy cooperation that this agreement 
created are imperfect, but the kind of transparency that the agreement created, in this 
case, transparency about the immediate intentions of the military forces of the two 
sides during their daily tasks, had immense value in the eyes of military planners on 
both sides as a way of defusing potential conflict. 
To cite one example, in a June 1992 meeting in Moscow, senior Russian 
General Staff officers privately raised concerns with U.S. Air Force officers about 
U.S. violations of Cuban airspace during Haitian refugee crisis operations. According 
to an American observer, "Having this issue successfully resolved with a minimum of 
fanfare helped build trust and confidence between the leaders of the two forces." It 
also furthered the Russian goal of gaining a voice in the international system. 
According to Pentagon officials, this program has succeeded so strongly in allowing 
each side to express its concerns that no claims have been made by either side in 
several years.34 
What perhaps best illustrates the importance that military officers attached to 
the DMA program is the fact that on both sides they had to fight bureaucratic battles 
to win the right to negotiate an agreement of military design under military 
34
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leadership. On the U.S. side, it is well known that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) spent 
a great deal of political capital to win over both civilians in the Pentagon and 
diplomats in the State Department to get approval for the negotiation process to go 
forward. Some think that Crowe may have devoted so much political effort to this 
issue that he damaged his ability to pursue other items on the JCS agenda.35 The 
hostility that senior U.S. officers faced was not merely the result of typical 
bureaucratic infighting over roles and resources, but also arose because civilians in 
the administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush feared seeming too 
"soft" on the Russians and sending the wrong signal to a potential adversary.36 
Military officers on both sides clearly would not have concentrated so many 
resources and so much effort on a program that was clearly experimental if they 
thought it would have only minimal value. Instead, significant individuals on both 
sides decided that the benefits of military-to-military cooperation outweighed the 
risks. 
The perceived success of these senior officer conferences has contributed to 
the second major area of growth in U.S.-Russian military ties in recent years, which is 
the official contacts between military officers and troops at all levels, including unit- 
to-unit visits and exercises of various kinds. As these programs have expanded in 






as well. Earlier, when the Cold War was still winding down, the primary goal of 
military contact programs was limited to the prevention of accidental conflict. Later, 
the goals have expanded to include building active trust among participants and 
encouraging common norms of military professionalism. 37 
Although these military contacts began in the Gorbachev era on an ad hoc 
basis, they were institutionalized in 1993 by a Memorandum of Understanding and 
Cooperation on Defense and Military Relations. 3 8 The Memorandum mandates a 
variety of periodic, usually annual, meetings between senior military officials at 
various ranks, which are often used to resolve specific issues or to convey important 
messages between government or military leaders.39 
Again, these meetings have given the Russian military an opportunity to 
exercise a voice. The Memorandum also establishes a Bilateral Working Group that 
meet each year to prescribe a program of lower-level unit activities and exercises. It is 
a sign of how important these meetings are to the military organizations of both sides 
that the number of scheduled U.S.-Russian military-to-military programs each year 
remained in the dozens through 1998/21 despite recent ups and downs in the two 
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Not all of these programs were actually implemented, largely because the 
Russian side had a tendency not to follow through on all of the activities, especially 
those planned for the latter half of each fiscal year. The Russian reason for the lack of 
follow-through was that funds were lacking. Russian forces have repeatedly refused 
offers of increased U.S. funding to assist Russian participation in the programs, 
leaving a surplus in the American budget allocated to military contacts, but that was 
considered on the Russian side to be an inappropriate use of this money. 
However, expanding contacts beyond the bilateral U.S. relationship, 
cooperating alongside the U.S. as equal partners was seen as fundamentally different 
from operating under the command of NATO as a former Cold War adversary.4^ 
Unit-to-unit meetings and exercises have become so common that they now 
seem normal and no longer command much press attention in the United States. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that these programs, even more than the 
DMA agreement, have provoked a great deal of political controversy in the recent 
past, especially in Russia. Russian military leaders have had to brave a storm of 
protest over the conduct of joint military exercises with U.S. troops. Army maneuvers 
involving U.S. troops held in Totsk, Russia, in 1994, code named Peacekeeper-94, 
were delayed and almost canceled because of opposition from Russian nationalists, 
who feared that U.S. Green Berets and intelligence operatives would use them to 
40
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obtain information for a future invasion.4* There was nonetheless strong Russian 
Defense Ministry backing for the exercises. Col.-Gen. Eduard Vorobev, first deputy 
chief of Russian ground forces, complained about "the problems we had to go through 
to explain these exercises to the public. "42 
Similar exercises the next year in Kansas, code named Peacekeeper-95 again 
came close to being canceled, this time because of Russian government disapproval 
of NATO bombing raids made against Bosnian Serbs in retaliation for their disruption 
of U.N. peacekeeping activities.43 While the Kansas exercises did not face the same 
level of public disapproval by Americans that the Totsk exercises had by the 
Russians, there were some political voices raised against them, including at the 
congressional level, as a national security risk.44 
Certainly on the Russian side, the fact that exercises have gone forward 
illustrates how highly top military leaders value them, since it would be politically 
easier for them to throw their lot in with the nationalists who are often a dominant 
voice in the Russian media, and declare such institutions unworkable in an uncertain 
security climate. This was especially the case with the "Centrazbat 97" joint 
peacekeeping exercises held in the Tashkent area of Uzbekistan in September 1997 






 The author of this thesis was directly evolved in preparation and conductions of this exercise. 
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from several post-Soviet states, Turkey, and the United States, as well as observers 
from Russia. The Russian Duma or parliament criticized the exercise , saying that 
"under the guise of ... peacekeeping ... the U.S. Armed Forces are intensively 
developing new potential theaters of military actions in the immediate vicinity of 
Russia's frontiers."45 Yet, the deputy head of military training for the Russian 
Defense Ministry, Gen. Vitalii Sokolov, said that similar exercises should be held as 
often as possible, since no outside threat to Russia exists at present and since 
peacekeeping operations are the wave of the future.46 
Indeed, within a few months, Russian participants joined a multilateral NATO 
military exercise for the first time as full-fledged participants in large numbers at a 
marine-landing peacekeeping exercise code named "Cooperative Jaguar" in Denmark. 
However, this did not mean that the political issue was resolved. In August 1998, a 
U.S.-Russian naval exercise scheduled to take place in Vladivostok had to be moved 
to a different Russian location following local protests about American intentions. 
The fact that the exercise was not canceled indicates how important military contacts 
are to Russian officers. 
Alongside these joint training exercises, there have been efforts made at higher 
education exchanges between Russian and U.S. officers as well. The first Russian 
graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Col. Andrei 
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Demurenko, went on to become Chief of Staff of the Sarajevo peacekeeping sector in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. While there is an agreement on the books to implement an 
exchange program between the Russian General Staff Academy and the U.S. National 
Defense University, American officers failed to come to the Academy due to a 
technical problem over being considered protected by diplomatic status.^? In any 
case, U.S. personnel have undergone training at Russia's advanced tactical courses 
"Vystrel" for field-grade special force and military intelligence officers, which now 
include preparation for peacekeeping operations. 
The crowning achievement of U.S.-Russian military cooperation thus far, and 
the end result of earlier peacekeeping exercises, has been the shoulder-to-shoulder 
service of forces from the two countries in Joint Endeavor peacekeeping operations in 
Bosnia. After lengthy and sometimes difficult negotiations at both the diplomatic and 
military levels about the level and character of Russian involvement in IFOR, Russia 
sent a mobile brigade drawn from its 76th and 98th airborne divisions to serve 
alongside a brigade of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, under the command of NATO 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) U.S. Gen. George Joulwan in 
Bosnia in February 1996. As in the case of all other military-to-military contacts cited 
here, policy coordination has not always gone smoothly, and each side has attempted 
to preserve as much of its autonomy and influence over the process as possible. Yet, 
47
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the achievements of this program in terms of enhanced stability and trust between the 
sides are clear.48 
Initial agreement on the plan was reached only after the U.S. side agreed that 
Joulwan would command Russian troops in his capacity as an American general and 
not as a NATO commander. This was primarily a salve for the wounded pride of 
Russian military officers, who at least at that time did see an important distinction, as 
noted previously, between serving alongside the United States and under NATO. 
The success of the personal and political interactions between Russian and 
NATO troops in Bosnia worked to build trust, and undoubtedly paved the way for 
Russia's signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. In Joulwan's assessment: 
We are building the foundation for the future, and ... I think a great deal 
of trust and confidence is coming. There are some tough issues left, 
that [need] to be worked out. But... I'm very optimistic of the Russia- 
NATO relationship for the future in Europe.49 
Russia renewed its commitment to keep troops under U.S. command in Bosnia 
when the IFOR operation was extended into its SFOR stage in late 1996. Russian 
defense leaders have maintained this commitment even in the face of an anti-NATO 
nationalist upsurge at home, and despite, once again, complaints that the Defense 
Ministry violated protocol, bypassing the Foreign Ministry, [and]... making decisions 
on foreign policy questions.^ 
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3.        Military Motives for Contact and Cooperation. 
Why have military leaders on both sides expended significant political capital 
to establish and continue these programs? The reason is that military- to-military 
contacts promise to provide their respective military organizations with important 
mission-related benefits. 51 Three benefits stand out in particular. Both sides value the 
training and sharing of organizational experience that military-to-military exercises 
provide. The Russian side, in particular, values the opportunity to express a "voice", 
or to exert influence, in international security affairs through senior officer exchanges 
at a time when its international standing is in decline. Both sides value transparency, 
or information-sharing, for reasons ranging from building trust to ensuring stability by 
avoiding misperception. 
First, both U.S. and Russian officers gain useful short-term training experience 
from these programs, especially in the area of peacekeeping. 
On the Russian side, the most unguarded statement about the direct military 
training benefits of military-to-military cooperation was made by Bosnian 
commander Shevtsov, who said, "It is useful because we are learning a lot, we are 
knocking our weakened military muscle into shape."52 
MFA - author. 
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The General Staff Academy offered no courses on peacekeeping operations, 
and hence Russian participation in the Totsk and Kansas exercises and in the Bosnian 
operation itself has provided officers with an educational opportunity that the Russian 
state may use elsewhere. 
Key lessons learned have been in such areas as how to avoid unnecessary 
conflict and maintain neutrality while interacting with hostile civilians,53 how to 
establish rules of engagement and communicate across language and procedural 
barriers in an ambiguous threat environment, and how to conduct public relations. 
The issue of educating the Russian troops about harmonized rules of 
engagement in peacekeeping exercises was noticed because of military-to-military 
exchanges. 
In addition to the practical training experience that the programs provide, the 
Russian side uses them to achieve a degree of voice or influence that it otherwise 
would not have over the new security environment evolving on its borders. One of the 
important functions served by military contact programs, especially private meetings 
between top military commanders, is to provide a forum for participants to raise 




Perhaps the most eloquent statement of Russian thinking along these lines is 
Shevtsov's testimony before Russia's upper house of parliament concerning Russian 
participation in the IFOR mission. The commander said: 
In conclusion, esteemed deputies, is Russia's participation in this 
operation necessary for NATO? It's necessary for Russia. NATO can 
solve these problems without Russia.... This operation is necessary not 
for the Defense Ministry, but for Russia as a European state.... Three 
hundred years ago we opened up a window to Europe thinking that we 
have interests there.... Virtually all European countries are taking part 
in this operation. We will refuse to take part once, we will refuse to 
take part twice-the third time everything will be done without the 
participation of Russia. By refusing to take part, we will hurt nobody 
but ourselves. We cannot consider ourselves to be a strong country, sit 
in these Russian corridors here and take no part in anything. 54 
C.       BROADENING      EUROPEAN       SECURITY      AND       DEFENSE 
INSTITUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA 
This chapter is a brief exercise in evaluating the subject of growing European 
defense self-awareness, and viability of a Russian point of view that the existing 
security arrangements for Europe should move away from sole reliance on the trans- 
Atlantic bond. Russia is explicitly and negatively concerned about NATO dominance 
in Europe, implying the overwhelming influence of the United States in European 
affairs. 
An obvious test-ground for the relationship between the United States and 
Europe   is   the   European   Security   and   Defense   Identity/Policy   (ESDI/ESDP) 
54
 As cited by Kimberly Marten Zisk, source - "Speeches in the Federation Council of the Russian Federation 
During the Discussion of the Question of Sending a Russian Military Contingent as Part of the Multinational Force." 
39 
development. For the purpose of this thesis it is sufficient to address the ESDI and 
ESDP as one general process, and exploring differences between the two can only 
muddle a wide scope approach. 
This chapter is structured around two following questions. 
• Is it in the Russian interest to expressly favor the ESDI/ESDP 
Development vs. NATO Enlargement? 
• Can the ESDI/ESDP development cause serious tensions in the trans- 
Atlantic zone? In other words, is it feasible to expect decoupling the U.S. 
and Europe? 
The questions can be addressed from two classical perspectives used in 
international relations studies: liberalism and realism. The first would lead to the 
examination of nuances and multifold factors, and there will always be something left 
that is unnoticed or unrecognized. The latter mostly ignores the factor of internal 
politics, but it is more suitable for general descriptions of international security issues. 
From the realist perspective, NATO is, to a great extent, a remnant of the Cold 
War.  At the same time it has proved to be a useful political institution, bolstering 
European stability by solving a security dilemma for its members, individually and as 
an alliance. The system is there, and from the American point of view, is worth 
maintaining engagement. There are two different ways of doing this. One option is to 
find or create an external threat and keep the Alliance against it, as in a new "cold 
war" scenario. The other choice is to identify new multiple tasks and to make a 
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modernized European security structure more relevant to known and foreseeable 
challenges, and capable of dealing with them. 
The Original NATO was not very much suited for the latter case. First, it 
lacked flexibility. Militarily, it was a means designed to fight a major conflict. In 
legal terms, there were complications also. 
Strictly speaking, the Washington Treaty5^ is complementary to the Charter of 
the United Nations (Preamble, Articles 1, 5, and 7). The Treaty is also quite specific 
about the use of force. It is restricted both conditionally - self-defense as recognized 
by Article 51 of the UN Charter, and territorially (Article 6 of the WT). 
In other words, NATO's freedom of action is limited to "measures as a result" 
(Article 5 of WT) of an armed attack on a member-country. 
Another important factor affecting NATO's ability to act pro-actively is the 
principle of consensus. In cases of collective defense it does not hinder the decision- 
making process. By simply joining the Alliance, member-states have explicitly 
expressed their consent to be prepared to act on the basis of "an attack against one is 
the attack against all." Nothing else would be as capable of generating the consensus 
needed to take action. This does not at all preclude the possibility of reaching an 
agreement on offensive actions, but the decision-making process would become more 
time-consuming and less efficient. 
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The ESDI/ESDP concept, if it is implemented with adjustments to the modern 
security environment in Europe, will alleviate the aforementioned contradictions. 
Since the major participants in the ESDI/ESDP are NATO members as well, strategic 
assessments will also be congruent. The ESDI/ESDP thinking could have never been 
possible without the luxury of the absence of a strategic threat to any European 
country, and in this respect overall security importance of NATO is unquestionable in 
this part of the world. This said, the ESDI/ESDP development is only feasible in the 
form of an extension and diversification of legitimate NATO missions. This format 
will allow addressing a wider range of security challenges of different magnitudes. 
The trans-Atlantic bond is not likely to go away, but it might even strengthen 
because European military institutions, even if there are duplications, in their essence 
will be rooted in the NATO experience. The trans-Atlantic alliance for America is its 
most important global relationship.56 It is the springboard for U.S. global 
involvement, allowing America and Europe together to serve "as the axis of global 
stability, the locomotive of the world's economy, and the nexus of global intellectual 
capital... just as important they are both home to the world's most successful 
democracies."5? 
Ironically, the more somebody thinks of offsetting Europe to the United States, 
the more the image of the latter is invoked. It comes in comparisons of continental- 
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size centers of power, with the inescapable presumption that Europe, when it unites, 
will become America's peer, and potentially its rival.58 Without going deeper into 
analysis, suffice to say that this pattern of thinking is an example of wishfulness 
devoid of reality, and leads to major misinterpretations. 
Speaking of duplications, it does not seem to be a very serious issue because it 
can take place only in a minor bureaucratic form. No serious infrastructure, assets and 
inventory, other than those of NATO, are available for practical development of the 
ESDI/ESDP. 
The going ahead of Europe with its military ambitions will allow bigger 
defense budgets to be successfully sold to the public. This will allow the United 
States to stay engaged in European affairs at a lower cost, to maintain the Alliance on 
its basic principles without revisiting its founding documents, and will not provoke 
suspicions about changing the defensive character of NATO. 
Promoting the ESDI/ESDP will also allow for the continuation of the process 
of expansion of the Euro-Atlantic community without actually accepting new states in 
NATO and threatening the efficiency and coherence of the Alliance. European NATO 
members will provide the necessary nexus. Theoretically it is possible even to extend 




The last consideration is important in the light of relations with Russia. 
Though the Euro-Atlantic expansion in this form will only increase western military 
capabilities and make them more flexible, it will allow Russia to shift to a less 
opposing rhetoric. "Allow" because the Russian political elite seems to be stuck with 
the dilemma of, on the one hand, overreacting to the perceived exclusion from the 
European security decision-making processes, and, on the other hand, understanding 
that Russian assertions of being a European nation imply responsible behavior and 
pragmatic acceptance of the mainstream thinking. If European security and defense 
arrangements are developed on the basis of something that Russia could claim as 
inherently belonging to, this will weaken the grounds for a bloc mentality, without 
actually changing the status quo in the Euro-Atlantic zone. 
It could also be recommended that the relationship between the Euro-Atlantic 
security community and Russia should be strengthened not through the n+1 formulae, 
but rather by means of individual relations with Russia, becoming a network of 
intertwined connections for the part of the West, and remaining bilateral for Russia at 
every instance. 
On the one hand, this system is better suited for developing confidence 
because it provides diverse channels of communication. It affords greater flexibility 
for alleviating inevitable disagreements as well. 
On the other hand, integrated Western communities-Russia relationships 
should be institutionalized and maintained in parallel to bilateral networking. This 
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combination is particularly well suited for constituting legitimacy, first, because it 
provides a forum, and second, its diverse system prevents allegations of usurpation of 
important decision-making by bigger players. 
At this point, it is important to say that the anti-NATO rhetoric in Russia is not 
the only prevalent way of expressing concerns about its relationship with the West. 
Voices of those who see EU enlargement as an even bigger challenge become more 
and more vocal. In the words of one local government officials in Kaliningrad region, 
"it's not NATO expansion we are afraid, but EU expansion."^ 
Suggestions for this chapter: 
• It is not in Russian long term interests to try exploit what it sees an 
opportunity to assert its more significant role in European affairs by 
playing up differences among members of trans-Atlantic community. 
These differences are not that significant in the first place, and attempts to 
overemphasize them would lead to alienation on the ground of Russia 
failing to understand the common values factor 
• Russia should not expect that U.S. engagement in European politics and 
security matters would decrease at any time in the foreseeable future. Not 
in the least, because the ESDI/ESDP stem from and is based upon a 
59
       Analyses       by       Radio       Free       Europe/Radio       Liberty,       available       [On       line]       at; 
http://www.rferl.Org/nca/features/1999/02/F.RU.990217140337.htmI. 
45 
common successful, from the Western point of view, story of NATO 
security guaranties with the United States in its core 
• There is no doubt that the U.S. itself will adjust its policy toward Europe to 
conform to new realities. No decoupling is feasible. "How the U.S.- 
European relationship is managed... must be Washington's highest 
priority."60 
60 Article by Zbignev Breziznski "Living with a new Europe" in The National interest. Summer 2000. Available 
[On line] at Pro Quest Direct Database, search (NATCH- EU+Europe+US). 
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III.     CONCLUSION 
In 1990, a totally new security paradigm emerged in the world: the USSR 
ceased to exist, its military forces withdrew from Eastern Europe, Warsaw Pact was 
disbanded and Germany reunited. In their essence these events were a deep and 
serious international crisis. Nobody had predicted thus process and, in its 
development, theory was lagging behind the practices. Its peaceful regulation was 
based on the agreement between the world's major political players to create a 
common European space that would include the Newly Independent states (a buzz 
term of the time) on the territory of the former USSR on equal terms in a new 
European security system. 61 
Between 1990-1994 Russian political elite believed that the end of the Cold 
War had the following meaning: all the European countries had decided to create a 
common security space, in which neither the West or the East would continue to 
exist. These perceptions created a base for euphoric romanticism of the early days 
after the end of the Cold War, when people experienced a great relief over 
disappearance of almost half a century threat of a major military conflict. That also 
led to expectations that NATO would never again be viewed as an adversary. The 
rhetoric adopted by the Alliance about its changing character contributed to this 
optimism. 
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The political atmosphere changed when two factors came into reality at the 
same time. First, the advent of NATO enlargement, and, second, growing awareness 
of the Russian people of the magnitude of the nation's economical and socio-political 
crisis. 
The process of NATO enlargement from the very beginning was perceived in 
Russia as targeting the strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic unity in order to enforce 
American influence on the Continent at the expense of Russia. The fear was rooted in 
the historic perception of antagonistic character of Russian and Anglo-Saxon 
interests. The factor that was believed to give the start to the Cold War in the first 
place. The famous " ... to keep Russia out" was interpreted in its straightforward 
meaning, without contextual connotation of the time when Lord Ismay phrased it. 
The genuine Russian concern appears to be not the threat of military 
confrontation, but exactly to find the country isolated from a well structured and 
secured elitist club of European nations. 
Therefore, the main conclusion of this thesis is that Russia's adamant negative 
reaction to NATO enlargement stems from the historic process of having to 
constantly demand to be recognized as a legitimate actor in European political and 
security affairs. 
Another argument is that Russia, by exploiting an anti-NATO enlargement 
posture, has actually exacerbated the issue. Moscow's position started to be described 
as infringement on  sovereign rights of independent  democratic  countries,   as an 
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attempt to create its zone of influence on the territory where historically this aspect 
bears a very sensitive character. 
On the other hand, the major NATO member - the U.S. - contributed to this 
negative development by showing at times direct disregard to Russian claims of 
having a say in international affairs. The case of Kosovo triggered the self-feeding 
rhetoric that pulled the relationship between Russia and the West back to that of the 
Cold War. 
The latter case showed another side too. It can be analytically described as a 
"litmus test" for the real common interest of the West and Russia to overcome 
differences and avoid a critical rift in mutual relations. Despite the heated 
phraseology and articulated suspicions the situation did not develop into an actual 
confrontation between NATO and Russia. Both nations ended up working on the 
issue together. 
What could be possible suggestions for the improvement of mutual relations 
between the U.S. and Russia ? 
It should be advised that Russia stops exploiting threatening-like rhetoric 
against any aspirant countries joining NATO. It only has an adverse affect by 
justifying the argument that new members should be admitted on the grounds of 
potential threat from Russia and that it should be demonstrated to Moscow that it will 
never be able to obstruct expression of the free will of the neighboring nations. 
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On the western European side, it would be very much beneficial to keep 
Russia involved in all security and stability building measures with the purpose of 
confidence building and keeping, this time, Russia in. 
There is evidence that the Russian political elite rationally accepts that the 
existence of NATO in its current capacity is a positive factor for Europe. It is a 
guarantor of stability in the relations along the internal West-West axis, and also in 
reforming and strengthening it as a reliable mechanism of European stability that can 
become one of the pillars of the new collective security architecture of the continent. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a defensive military and political union of 
democratic states is not a military threat for a democratic Russia.62 
However, Russia can not disregard its other key interest: achieving and 
strengthening social, political and economic stability inside the country. It is from this 
point of view, which is political and psychological, that NATO enlargement 
contradicts Russia's national interests. The danger lies in the emergence of the feeling 
of military and political isolation of Russia, in the revival of anti-Western and 
militaristic trends in the public. 
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This is even more true, since the West did not (and could not) find arguments 
which would convince the Russian society that the advance of NATO to the borders 
of Russia by embracing the former allies of the USSR, speculating on the idea of 
"Russian imperialism", would vitally serve the interests of Russia - especially 
considering the fact that Russia itself is left out by expanding Atlantic Alliance. 
Russia's image of itself, and its focus of efforts in foreign policy will remain a 
complex subject of debate within Russian for years to come. This is true if you only 
consider the fact that the geographic scope and diversity of the country will continue 
to nourish the tendency of asserting a special role for Russia outside of Western 
Europe in the Eurasian landmass. This will always be source of debate between the 
atlanticists world^3 and the Eurasianists. 
What can be predicted is that even if Russian political elite and public in 
general come to grips with identifying Russia's proper relationship to the West, 
security debates will continue on the realist-geopolitical basis. With the achievement 
of a certain level of socio-economic and political stability there might be less reasons 
for insecure reflections on the relationship with the West. 
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